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how can God so much as know that he has the power to actualize T(W) unless
he knows whether or not Adam would eat the apple if placed in h? Hence,
God's knowledge of which largest state of affairs he'll strongly actualize must
be logically posterior to his knowledge of what Adam would do in h; if God
doesn't first know the latter, there is no way in which he can know the former.
But if God can thus employ Wierenga's counterfactuals of world-actualization only if he knows Molinist counterfactuals, then Wierenga's counterfactuals can play no essential role in a theory of middle knowledge.
As is customary in reviews such as this, my remarks have focussed primarily on the faults I find with Wierenga's work, and thus might well mask the
large extent to which I find his positions admirably stated and ably defended.
Despite what I see as the three significant flaws in the book, and despite the
surprisingly careless editing which was done with the text (I noticed well
over a dozen cases of misspelling, missing words and the like), Wierenga's
The Nature of God is a fine piece of work, one which scholars concerned
with divine attributes should profit from considerably.s
NOTES
1. See "Maximal Power," in Alfred J. Freddoso, ed., The Existence and Nature o/God,
(Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp. 81-113.
2. See section 4.5 of Freddoso's introduction, in his On Divine Foreknowledge: Part
IVo/the Concordia. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 53-62.
3. See Hasker, God, Time, and Knowledge, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989),
chapters 2-7.
4. See, for example, Freddoso's introduction to 011 Divine Foreknowledge, pp. 22, 50.
5. I am grateful to Alfred Freddoso, Alvin Plantinga and Especially Edward Wierenga
for comments on an earlier version of this review.

Relativism, Nihilism, and God, Philip E. Devine. Notre Dame, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1989. xix and 119. $22.95
FREDERICK FERRE, The University of Georgia
This is a remarkable little book. It packs plenty of explosives into its 109
pages of text. It reads well, written in a fresh, confident tone. And it is written
in a good cause: to provide theoretical underpinnings that permit joint allegiance to the life of faith and the life of reason.
The argument by which this cause is pursued is quite straightforward. In
the name of a transcendent Truth, Devine attacks pragmatism, relativism, and
nihilism. The first naturalizes the standards of truth, the second pluralizes
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them, and the third abandons them. Each position is shown to refute itself,
and in various ways Devine challenges his opponents to prove their contentions without smuggling in some appeal to a stronger sense of truth than their
doctrines permit. (His technique of shifting the burden of proof is subtle and
effective.) Then, having shown Truth indispensable, he argues that the most
plausible understanding of the basic moral and epistemic norms, Goodness
and Truth, can be provided by appeal to God as certifier. An atheist defense
of these basic norms, as somehow floating in metaphysical mid-air, may, of
course, be proposed. "But the source of such norms is as obscure as is God,
and hence it is not plausible that the existence of such norms could be
regarded as an intelligible possibility, and the existence of God not" (p. 84).
In the course of this argument, Devine takes on, with special relish, Rorty
and Derrida, Wittgenstein and Nietzsche. The book is much too short, of
course, for detailed exposition and examination of the positions that he harries, but he has a keen ear for cant and a deft hand at exposing paradox.
Occasionally, as one of the prices paid for such deft compression of argument, Devine cartoons the positions he intends to skewer. It is unfair, for example, in defining William James's pragmatism, to quote out of context the famous
line, "The true ... is only the expedient in our way of thinking" (p. 23).
James typically delighted in using the most provocative language possible,
then adding important qualifiers. The "expedient," finally is not mere gross
immediate practical advantage (e.g., getting tenure, as Devine suggests), but,
as James put it, what can be depended upon on the whole and over the 1011g
run. The book would have benefitted from deeper discussion of more sophisticated and refined pragmatic approaches to truth. Instead, Devine immediately
switched attention to Rorty's version and chased off after it, leaving at least this
reader feeling that important possibilities were never adequately addressed.
Another disappointment was in Devine's critique of "applied ethics." It is
an important topic. Everything Devine says about the need for philosophers to
avoid becoming mere propagandists is right on target. But he seems to assume
without the slightest argument that "applied ethics" entails partisanship and
disregard for Truth. This is hardly necessary. It might be better, as he acknowledges in a footnote, if another set of terms rather than "applied" and
"pure" were used for the distinction between ethical theory, as considered in
close connection with some specific domain of human concern, and ethical
theory as considered at higher levels of abstraction from the current issues of
life. Some concrete data are necessary at any level, no matter how highly
general; some theoretical concepts are necessary at any level, no matter how
specific. It might be more apt, if so, to discuss the contrast between "general"
and "specific" ethics. Then "general" ethics could be considered more like
the area illumination provided in an art gallery, to help us see the various pictures
in their mutual relationship, and "specific" ethics could be considered like the
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spotlights focussed on particular works themselves, to help us see more
clearly into the details. Both are needed. General ethics can learn much from
the special challenges raised in close wrestling with particular areas where
policy is required. Specific ethics can benefit from the connections provided by
the powerful abstractions of general ethics. In the end Devine reaches a sound
conclusion:
The most distinctive public responsibility [of philosophers] is not tied to any
particular issue. It is to do what we can to produce citizens who are aware
of the issues and the tradition of discussing them rationally (p. 20).

This is true. But there is nothing wrong in principle with examining "the issues"
closely, in pools of intense light, as well as distantly, in large areas of general
illumination. If in practice philosophers become partisan propagandists, this is
a reflection of our human frailties, not an argument against giving special ethical
attention to medicine, business, the environment, war, and the like.
Finally, the book suffers from an anticlimactic ending. The real climax is
the moral argument for God offered in Chapter 6. There the weakness of
nihilism makes contact with the potency of theism and everything is tied
together, morally and epistemologically. It is a bold stroke to cap many such
strokes. There are questions left, of course. For example, does Devine really
want to rest so much on mere "picture preference" when choosing between
a personal deity and austere, impersonal Truth? But, despite many unsettled
issues, the book coheres and concludes there.
Unfortunately, Chapter 7, on religion, tries to cover so many issues that the
book thins out like a fresh stream into a marshy delta. At the very end Devine
adds a promissory note for another book on "problems that arise when one
attempts to embody this project in our world ... " (p. 109). Actually, the
religion chapter already starts this embodied discussion. This is why, perhaps,
it feels disconnected from the previous chapters of the book.
We may look forward to another run at these themes, then picked up again
and more fully treated, when Devine delivers on his promised next volume.
Meanwhile, we have a book in hand that deserves-and will doubtless attract-plenty of attention.

Theology and Integration, Four Essays in Philosophical Theology. Anders JefTner.
(Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis. Studia Doctrinae Christianae Upsaliensia, 28)
Distributed by Almqvist & Wiksell International, Stockholm; 1987; 73 pp. n.p.

ALAN P. F. SELL, The University of Calgary
One of Sweden's most perceptive philosophical theologians here presents
four essays, the running theme of which is the relationship between religious

